The
conception of reason which dominated the western philosophical tradition
involved the interplay between the interiorization of literacy as an
interrogatory stance and the inner logic of the totalizing thrust of the
continuous prose generated by alphabetical writing.
(A) Metaphysics: From the very beginning, metaphysical
inquiries were designed to provide objective grounds for imposing closure on
the endless questioning licensed by an interiorized interrogatory stance. For centuries, the focus of these inquiries
was governed by the idealist and naturalist conventions designed by Plato and
Aristotle. (Plato's realm of
interpenetrating Ideal Forms has the characteristics of a bounded, changeless,
enduring text consisting of clear and distinct conceptions woven together by
the logic of continuous prose. On his
part, Aristotle implanted those forms in a teleologically and hierarchically
structured natural order.)
The role assigned to metaphysical
inquiries rested on the assumption that one must know the structure of reality
in order to understand the workings of natural forces in contingent
events. Two examples illustrate the
point at issue: (1) Aristotle's supposition that the natural
order has a teleological structure led him to argue that objects thrown into
the air fall to the ground because they seek their natural place. (2)
The Hellenic fascination with form privileged universals over
individuals, since individuals resist easy categorizations.
Plato and Aristotle played leading
roles in the triumph of literacy over orality as the foundation of
culture. That triumph generated an
awareness that languages generated by literary traditions took on lives of
their own. At roughly the same time,
exiles returning to Judea from the exile in Babylonia set in motion a process
which led to a widespread characterization of adherents of an emerging Judaism
as the People of the Book. Centuries
later, as Christianity spread throughout the Mediterranean
area, Christians appropriated the Jewish Scriptures as an Old Testament in
order to claim that the Christian Scriptures, as a New Testament, provided a
code for laying bare how God was active in Israel's history. And as they sought to reconcile a traditional
belief in exclusive election with the belief that Christianity had universal
import, they assumed that a creative tension between faith and reason could
yield definitive readings of the text.
In the Middle Ages, these assumptions and beliefs were woven into a
metaphorical reference to Two Books, the Book of Nature and the
Scriptures. In this context, both were
enduring, changeless, bounded texts governed by the logic of continuous
prose. Since the Book of Nature was supposedly
authored by a rational and purposive Creator, anyone endowed with "natural
light of reason" could read the moral will of God inscribed in a
teleologically structured natural order.
And since the Scriptures supposedly spoke as God's own description of
his saving activity in human history, they must be truth-telling.
Since medieval authors accepted without
question the traditional dictum, "Grace builds on nature," they used
this metaphor to validate a theory of interpretation which accorded primacy to
the Scriptures as the revealed Word of God, but promised that a knowledge of
God's creative will supplied by metaphysical inquiries would contribute
significantly to the interpretation of difficult passages.
(B) Epistemology: Ockham stood the medieval pre-dilection for
metaphysical inquiries on its head with a simple assertion: "There are individuals; how do we form valid universal
concepts?" In its own right, that
question asks: "How do we move from
noting similarities and differences between individuals to categorizations such
as `human beings' and to conceptions which describe human beings as `rational
animals'?" And, more generally,
"How do we know that we know?"
(C) Methodology: At the dawn of the Modern Era, Descartes was
convinced that his methodical doubt could resolve epistemological issues by
providing a certain starting point for the acquisition of an equally certain
knowledge. In and through this method,
he privileged the interrogatory stance inherent in the interiorization of
literacy over the logic of the totalizing thrust of continuous prose. As a mathematician, however, he regarded an
intuition of the infinite as a positive notion and used that notion in an
ontological argument for the existence of a God who authored the Book of Nature
as an autonomous text written in the language of mathematics, not the language
of Aristotelian metaphysics.
(Presumably, an infinite God would not create individuals who could be
deceived by their senses.) And in this
context, he used the methodical doubt (1) to generate a geometrization of the
universe which decisively undermined the medieval belief in a hierarchically
and teleologically structured universe, (2) to posit a myth of pure beginnings
on the part of solipsistic thinking beings, and (3) to support his description
of medieval belief-systems as edifices erected on sand.
(Supplementary addendum: The Hellenic literary tradition interiorized
the detachment inherent in literacy as an interrogatory stance. To transform endless questioning into focused
inquiries, it embraced the rule of a metaphorical One. As the framework for analyses of the
interplay among language, experience and reality, the One filled the hollow
center of inquiries structured by a logical principle of identity with a
fictive voice of reason. Presumably,
inquiries governed by reason would ultimately generate an ideal language which
could be consigned to an autonomous text.
In marked contrast, the Hebrew
literary tradition interiorized the detachment inherent in literacy as an
eruptive self-consciousness. To explore
the depths of newly self-conscious individuals, authors who used stories to
process the belief that an incomprehensible God had been intimately involved
with Israel's memorably unique patriarchs and matriarchs forged a literary
form, the prose narrative. This form
inscribed a narrative rather than a timeless structure and a narrative voice
rather than the dispassionate and disinterested voice of reason.
Consequently, Descartes not only
transformed the interrogatory stance into a methodical doubt. Through his metaphorical description of
medieval belief-systems as edifices erected on sand, he fused the restructuring
of thought in the Hellenic tradition with the narrative structure of the Hebrew
tradition. Thus, as one applied the
methodical doubt, one presumably eliminated one's own peculiar prejudices,
pre-conceptions and assumptions as well as the conventions supporting the
edifice to be deconstructed. In the end,
the promise that stripping all this away would yield a certain starting point
effectively posited a timeless myth of pure beginnings, while the use of reason
emerged as the guarantor of objectivity.
But rationalism's triumph was a hollow victory, since the introduction
of the narrative structure evoked the emphasis on self-consciousness which was
largely responsible for the unbridgeable Cartesian chasm between subjectivity
and objectivity.)
(D) Hermeneutics: In the twentieth century, Logical Positivism
and Phenomenology took the fascination with methodology to its logical
extremes. (Logical Positivism claimed to
delineate the scientific method.
Phenomenology was more indebted to the focus on self-consciousness
encoded in the early stories in the Hebrew narrative tradition, but it, too,
promised to lay bare the core of conscious experiences without
interpretation.) Despite the collapse of
both Logical Positivism and Phenomenology from within, however, most academic
philosophers ignore Nietzsche's exposure of the will to power hidden in the
rule of reason over metaphysical, epistemological, methodological and ethical
inquiries. The reason is not hard to
find. If they acknowledged the validity
of Nietzsche's critique, they would have to abandon the assumption that a
literary construct provides a detached, disinterested, dispassionate, god-like
perspective on the interplay between language, experience and reality which
reasonable beings can occupy interchangeably.
By extension, they would have to abandon the pretense that they, as
masters of the use of reason, speak anonymously, yet exercise a god-like
authority over past, present and future readings of an inter-textual dialogue
among the three strands in the western literary tradition, literature,
philosophy and theology.
In his re-readings of the western
philosophical and theological tradition, Nietzsche exposed the literary origins
of the assumption that the use of reason is morally neutral. In effect, he revived the issues of infinite
divisibility and infinite regress which the restructuring of thought centered
in a metaphorical One had presumably resolved.
To expose the arbitrariness of distinctions and boundaries enshrined in
everyday languages, he insisted that analyses of language and experience must
address the implications of a dictum, "Nothing is true; everything is permitted."
In his Genealogy of Morals, in particular, Nietzsche deconstructed the
literary foundations of Aristotle's correspondence theory of truth by advancing
an evolutionary theory and filling the hollow center of its structure with an
all-pervasive will to power. In this and
other texts, Nietzsche forged two distinctive literary forms, the archeology of
knowledge and the genealogy of morals, which he used to show, beyond question,
that the language which transmits western culture is the product of a literary
tradition. In their own right, these
literary forms encoded a hermeneutical theory capable of competing with the
hermeneutical theories advanced by nineteenth century Protestant biblical
scholars. To move beyond protests against
the power-structure enshrined in the institutional Church at the dawn of the
Modern Era, these scholars hoped to set forth transparent readings of the
Scriptures which could speak as an immediate word of God, devoid of human
interpretation. In this vein, Nietzsche
sought to set forth a reading of the western literary tradition which uncovered
the pervasive workings of an impersonally operating will to power. His goal was obvious. If a reading of the literary tradition laid
bare an evolutionary process propelled by a will to power, the reading
strategies he authored would replace the literary conventions invoked by
proponents of traditional metaphysical, epistemological, methodological, and
ethical inquiries.
To accomplish his purpose, Nietzsche
wove critical conventions generated by the interplay between rationalism and
empiricism into distinctive literary forms which supplement the interiorized
interrogatory stance invoked by Descartes with a reading code designed to
expose the literary origins of the languages which texture the experiences of
inhabitants of western cultures. In and
through these literary forms, he (1) extended Descartes' description of
medieval belief-systems as edifices erected on sand to include everyday
languages, (2) derived strategies designed to "deconstruct" both the
rationalist assumption that reason speaks with authority and the literary
foundations of these languages, and (3) integrated these strategies in a
hermeneutical theory.
(Addendum: To my knowledge, Nietzsche never acknowledged
a debt to the hermeneutical inquiries of Protestant biblical scholars in the
mid-nineteenth century. These scholars
were determined to "save the theory" inscribed in Luther's use of the
slogan, sola Scriptura, to counter
the Catholic tradition's emphasis on Scripture and Tradition. Though few were aware of the fact, this
slogan committed them to inquiries governed by the medieval metaphor of the Two
Books. And this commitment demanded
that, if they hoped to live with intellectual integrity, they had to find a
code for reading a sprawling text as a revealed Word of God capable of speaking
timelessly and immediately, without ambiguity or interpretation, to human
beings in any age or culture.
Since they were thoroughly versed in
the critical standards which governed research in German Universities at the
time, they realized the magnitude of the project they embraced. That project:
To show that the Judaic-Christian Scriptures were indeed a single text
which contained within itself the means to strip away the interpretations
imposed on it over the centuries and thereby allow the text to speak for
itself. In effect, they recognized the
need to show that a sprawling text was self-interpreting and, if it were to
speak the Word of God immediately, self-referential.
In my scattered readings of the
dialogue among them, I found no awareness of the issues raised by the
transition from orality to literacy as the foundation of Christianity in the
Modern World. On the one hand, they
embraced the immediacy of face-to-face communication celebrated in Luther's
emphasis on Paul's dictum, "Faith comes through preaching." On the other, they were confident that they
could successfully replace traditional theories of interpretation with a
hermeneutical theory capable of letting the Scriptures speak for
themselves. But their growing awareness
of the role played by literary conventions in the composition of messages
consigned to writing illuminated critical differences between face-to-face
communications and proclamations inscribed in texts written by unique
individuals for an imagined audience.
Today, I can understand why they could
not yet recognize that the conception of a self-interpreting and
self-referential text was the product of the rule of reason over the western
philosophical and theological traditions.
But I am also convinced that the polar oppositions between faith and
reason, reason and revelation, faith and works, and the sacred and the profane
posited by Luther provided a pernicious foundation for their belief that an
understanding of the workings of literary conventions would enable them to set
forth readings in and through which the Scriptures spoke for themselves.
This belief was immensely fruitful,
but only in the way that a bad theory is better than no theory at all. In effect, the theory implicitly recognized
that fact that the anxiety of authorship experienced by authors of original
visions and projects was centered in the need to invent literary conventions to
supply for the absence of the tacit clues that supplement oral-aural
communication. Implicitly or explicitly,
these scholars hoped to identify the literary conventions utilized by biblical
authors to guide and govern the understanding of their texts. Presumably, they could use a knowledge of the
workings of these conventions in any passage to lay bare a core message which
spoke as an immediate Word of God without interpretation.
One of the reading strategies they
explored in depth was generated by the dawning awareness of the use of a
variety of literary forms (genres) by authors whose texts were incorporated in
both the Jewish and Christian Scriptures.
In its own right, the strategy promised that an understanding of the
conventions inscribed in these literary forms would guide readers to the core
message of the passage.
(Addendum: In the United States, Bultmann's promise that
demythologizing the Scripture through the use of a hermeneutical theory
indebted to Heidegger would enable the Scriptures to speak as an uninterpreted
Word of God was gladly embraced by Christians held captive by the slogan, sola Scriptura. Here, I merely note that Heidegger's
hermeneutical theory was designed to evoke a stance of open responsiveness to a
creative and gracious Being in which all somehow participated. Understandably, a stance of open
responsiveness seemed to provide a contemporary framework for Bultmann's
revival of Luther's insistence that only those who were willing to stand naked
before God through a confession of utter sinfulness could receive justification
by faith alone,)
Over time, this seminal project yielded
the critical apparatus developed in greater detail in the theories which
dominated literary criticism in the twentieth century. In short, once they recognized the
textualization of the polemics between Catholic and Protestant theologians,
biblical scholars developed a sophisticated classification of distinctive literary
forms (genres) used by the storytellers and prophets whose texts were stitched
together by redactors in Babylon. When
readings governed by the use of these literary forms could not resolve all
issues, they recognized that the choice of a distinctive literary form as the
framework for a distinctive message forced them to speculate concerning the
intention of the author. From there, it
was a small step to efforts to rescue objectivity through a theory of
historical criticism, with its promise that the core message could be laid bare
by a recreation of the workings of culture at the time when the passage in
question was composed supplemented by a recreation of the concerns of members
of the community addressed by this passage.
Today, the collapse of the project from
within forces biblical scholars who are honest searchers to admit the
impossibility of forging a hermeneutical theory capable of showing that the
Scriptures can be read without interpretation.
In effect, the collapse confirms that any pretense that the Scriptures
can be read literally rests on polar oppositions between faith and reason and
between reason and revelation. On my
part, I would add, quite explicitly: The
collapse also dramatizes the fact that abandonment of a search for intellectual
integrity involves hidden exercises of the will to power exposed so
relentlessly by Nietzsche.
I suggest, therefore, that Nietzsche's
critique of rationalism effectively replaced traditional metaphysical,
methodological and ethical inquiries with a focus on a code for re-reading the
western philosophical and theological traditions. However, since few could share Nietzsche's
worship of naked power, Heidegger was the continental intellectual who made
hermeneutical issues respectable.
Heidegger did not deny that a will to power was at work in the evolution
of the western literary tradition, but he replaced Nietzsche's use of a will to
power as the god-term which lend coherence to his hermeneutical theory with the
notion of Being forged by the pre-Socratics prior to the emergence of
significant distinctions among language, experience and reality. In his hermeneutical theory, he supplemented
Nietzsche's concern with the textuality of experience with his own emphasis on
the historicity of experience and used the participative character of human
existence implicit in this notion to transform the Cartesian distinction
between subjectivity and objectivity into an interplay between understanding
and interpretation. (The pregnant
metaphor: "Language is an abode in
which we dwell suspended over an abyss.")
Turning to an analysis of the workings
of language, Heidegger fashioned a metaphor which depicted language as a
vehicle for the revelation of the meaning of Being. To support this metaphor, he noted that, when
we struggle to express our deepest concerns, we find ourselves searching for
words. And to unpack the metaphor, he
asserted (1) that language, not the language-user, speaks, (2) that language
speaks Being, and (3) that "language reveals; language
conceals". And in this context, he
transformed the search governed by Aristotle's correspondence theory of truth
into a search for an authentically human stance toward Being.
In effect, Heidegger replaced a
privileging of a compelling power of reason with a reading code designed to
voice prophetic calls for open responsiveness to the unfolding of a creative
and gracious Being at work in the western literary tradition. (The contrast with Nietzsche's call to
welcome supermen who would live beyond good and evil is obvious.)
Earlier, I noted Heidegger's
influence on Rudolph Bultmann. His
influence can also be found in the writings of Karl Rahner. But the postmodernists were the first to
recognize that the use of god-terms by both Nietzsche and Heidegger offered
ample evidence that their hermeneutical theories were indebted to a desire to
escape from the rule of reason. In their
appropriation of Heidegger's hermeneutical theory, they embraced Heidegger's
assertion that language speaks, that language conceals as well as reveals, and
that the use of reason generates rationalizations that conceal as well as
reveal. And to support the pretense that
they themselves speak from nowhere, they insist that their hermeneutics of
suspicion does not invoke or require a god-term.
For the workings of a reading code
authorized by a hermeneutics of suspicion, see Reflection 39, on The Myth of
Modernity. In this Reflection, I
suggest that the myth of Modernity is the primary target of deconstructive
readings generated by a hermeneutics of suspicion.
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